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The idea of a democratic developmental state forms part of the cur-
rent development discourse advocated by international aid agen-
cies, deliberated on by academics, and embraced by policy makers 
in many emerging economies in the global South. What is notice-
able in this discourse is how little attention has been paid to a dis-
cussion of the essence of a democratic developmental state, and 
much of what passes for theory is little more than policy speak and 
political rhetoric.
This volume fi lls a gap in the literature on the democratic develop-
mental state. Analyzing the different approaches to the implementa-
tion of democratic developmental states in various countries in the 
South, it evaluates the extent to which these are merely replicating 
the central tenets of the East Asian model of the developmental 
state or if they are succeeding in their attempts to establish a new 
and more inclusive conceptualization of the state. In particular, the 
authors scrutinize to what degree the attempts to build a demo-
cratic developmental state may be distorted by the imperatives of 
neoliberalism.
The volume broadens the understanding of the Nordic model of a 
democratic developmental state and shows how it represents an 
additional, and perhaps contending understanding of the develop-
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Toward a Conceptualization of the Democratic Development 




























tions	 that	promoted	 rapid	economic	growth	 (Beeson	2004).	Key	 to	 the	
success	of	the	Tigers	was,	indisputably,	the	establishment	of	a	strong	and	
relatively	insulated	state	bureaucracy,	manifesting	what	Evans	(1995)	has	
referred	 to	 as	 “embedded	 autonomy.”	 Governed	 by	 strict	 meritocratic	
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all	East	Asian	developmental	 states,	 strong	political	 leadership	with	an	






tal	 state.	This	 relationship	 involved	both	 regulation	 and	 support.	Thus,	







































tions	with	 other	 developing	 countries.	While	 the	CPC	 is	 not,	 in	 a	 strict	




formulate	 policy	 unfettered	by	political	 opposition.	 In	 that	 respect,	 the	
function	of	the	CPC	was	similar	to	that	of	the	“focal	unit,”	which	was	key	
to	steering	developmental	part	in	the	other	East	Asian	states.	It	is	evident,	

























which	 gives	 continued	 relevance	 to	 the	model.	The	neoliberal	 position,	
however,	 lost	 traction	following	the	market	crash	of	the	1990s	and	was	
further	weakened	by	the	global	financial	meltdown	of	2008,	which	pre‐
cipitated	 extensive	 and	unprecedented	 state	 intervention	 in	 the	 econo‐











set	of	 criteria	derived	 from	East	Asia,	 others	have	argued	 that	 this	 is	 a	
































tualizations	 are	 not	 noticeably	 short	 on	 detail	 on	 the	 steps	 that	 states	
might	follow	in	pursuing	this	democratic	ideal.	However,	notwithstanding	















“developmental”	 label	and,	 in	particular,	 the	 term	“democratic	develop‐
































































civil	society	relations.	Contra	Marx,	 the	state	 in	 this	context	 is	not	seen	
primarily	as	an	instrument	of	the	capitalist	class.	
Underpinning	the	formation	of	a	network	of	nationwide	labour	un‐





ented	 components	 of	 capitalism,	 nationwide	multi‐sectoral	 negotiation	
was	combined	with	local,	sector‐specific	negotiation,	in	a	system	of	eco‐
nomic	regulation	commensurate	with	the	overall	strength	of	the	economy.	









both	workers	 and	managers	assumed	 responsibility	 for	promoting	and	
steering	growth.	The	notion	of	a	profit‐sharing	system	was	central	to	the	







based	 parties,	 social	 democrats	 gained	 legislative	 power	 in	 the	 Nordic	
states	and,	in	the	process,	the	social	compact	that	had	been	developed	in	
the	 workplace	 was	 extended	 to	 all	 citizens	 as	 universal	 welfare	 rights	








process,	 rights	 negotiated	 between	 the	 unions	 and	 employers	 became	
universal	rights	for	all	citizens.	
In	recent	years,	however,	these	universal	rights	have	been	under	at‐

















have	met	with	resistance.	At	a	 theoretical	 level,	defenders	of	 the	model	
have	 argued	 convincingly	 that	 the	 trust	 that	 has	 been	 engendered	 be‐
tween	government	(and	the	state)	and	labour,	supported	by	the	engage‐
ment	of	civil	society	and	a	process	of	democratic	decision	making,	has	led	













the	 richer	West,	 a	process	 that	has	both	 suppressed	wages	 and	under‐














































the	 historical	 and	 geopolitical	 factors,	 particularly	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	





































The	 challenge	 of	 reconciling	 democratic	 principles,	 a	 respect	 for	
basic	human	rights	and	participatory	forms	of	governance,	with	a	state‐




opmental	 states,	 the	achievements	of	 the	Ethiopian	state	have	been	re‐
markable.	In	the	decade	or	more	since	democratic	developmentalism	was	
adopted	as	the	official	policy	of	the	ruling	People’s	Revolutionary	Demo‐










































propose	 alternative	 approaches	 to	 economic	 development.	 The	 segue	
from	revolutionary	democracy	 to	developmental	democracy,	he	argues,	



























ceptual	 indeterminacy	 to	 two	 factors.	 The	 first	 relates	 to	 the	 fact	 that	
while	there	is	a	broad	consensus	in	the	literature	on	the	defining	elements	
of	 the	East	Asian	developmental	 state,	 there	 is	considerably	 less	agree‐
ment	on	what	constitutes	a	democratic	developmental	 state	other	 than	
that	it	should	adopt	the	attributes	of	procedural	democracy	in	its	pursuit	
of	 state‐driven	 growth.	 Furthermore,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 archetypal	
model	of	a	democratic	developmental	state,	it	is	left	to	the	ideologues	and	
policy	makers	of	individual	states	to	chart	their	own	course	in	reconciling	
a	 socially	 and	 politically	 transformative	 agenda	with	 that	 of	 rapid	 eco‐
nomic	growth.	In	the	South	African	case,	they	argue,	this	situation	was	ag‐
gravated	 by	 inconsistency	 in	 the	 government’s	 economy	 growth	 path.	
Where	ANC	policy	documents	released	 in	 the	run	up	to	 the	 first	demo‐
cratic	 elections	 stressed	 the	 importance	 of	 an	 interventionist	 state	 in	
A	CONCEPTUALIATION	OF	THE	DEMOCRATIC	DEVELOPMENTAL	STATE		21	














measures	municipalities	must	 follow	 to	 ensure	 citizen	 participation	 in	
planning	 and	 policy‐making	 process	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 Based	 on	 a	 case	
study	of	a	poor	suburb	in	Cape	Town,	the	chapter	reveals	that	there	is	little	
or	no	understanding	of	a	developmental	state	among	municipal	officials,	








democratic	 developmental	 state	 can	 be	 considered	 neither	 fully	 demo‐
cratic	(in	the	sense	that	it	has	established	effective	mechanisms	for	citizen	















































major	 infrastructural	 development	 programs,	 particularly	 in	 urban	 re‐








vestment	 in	 the	 Brazilian	 petrochemical	 industry,	 concessions	 were	
granted	to	national	and	international	firms	with	exclusive	rights	to	spe‐
cific	oil	fields.	Not	only	was	this	move	seen	as	a	betrayal	of	the	objectives	




Rouseff,	 although	herself	 not	 implicated	 in	 the	 scandal,	 further	 contra‐







































































The	 state’s	 intervention	 in	 the	 clothing	 manufacturing	 sector	 in	
South	Africa	 is	 illustrative	of	 the	effects	of	poorly	conceived	and	 imple‐
mented	economic	growth	policies.	The	manufacturing	of	clothing	had	his‐

















easy	 access,	 also	 penetrated	 the	 country’s	 domestic	market.	 In	 this	 in‐
stance,	 Seekings	 maintains,	 a	 developmental	 policy	 intended	 to	 create	
jobs	led	to	their	destruction	and	the	decimation	of	an	industry.	
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were	 formed	over	 time,	 these	were	sometimes	based	on	political	horse	
trading	between	political	parties	and	they	were	 far	 from	all‐embracing,	
frequently	excluding	important	constituents	such	as	farmers,	 labourers,	

















mentary	democracy	 and	 the	promise	of	 citizen	participation	under	 the	
presidency	of	Sukarno.	This	was	not	to	be.	The	impacts	of	the	Cold	War	
and	Sukarno’s	shift	from	multiparty	democracy	to	a	form	of	centralist	gov‐
ernment,	 termed	 “guided	democracy,”	was	 followed	by	a	 coup	d’etat	 in	























were	good	and	unemployment	 levels	were	 low.	 In	 this	context	 the	pro‐
spective	gains	 to	be	derived	 from	a	 social	 compact	were	clear	 to	all.	 In	
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may	 also	 be	 ascribed	 to	 the	 declining	 influence	 of	 national	 communist	
parties	(and	radical	socialists)	following	the	onset	of	the	Cold	War.	
It	was	during	this	era,	he	asserts,	that	Norwegian	society	embraced	
what	 has	 been	 termed	 “democratic	 capitalism.”	 According	 to	 Ruesche‐
meyer	et	al.,	“Democratic	capitalism	rests	on	a	class	compromise	between	
labour	and	capital	in	which	the	interests	of	both	sides	are	to	varying	ex‐




capitalists…of	 those	who	have	 the	control	of	 the	means	of	production,”	
while	 “democracy	means	 that	 the	power	 is	 in	 the	hands	of	 the	people”.	


















































more,	 is	eroding	many	of	 the	 institutions	and	social	practices	 that	gave	
rise	to	the	welfare	state	and	which	provided	the	platform	for	the	economic	
success	of	 the	Nordic	model.	He	argues	 that	as	 the	hegemony	of	global	
capitalism	has	spread	it	has	given	rise	to	what	has	come	to	be	called	the	
“competition	state”	(Münch	2012).	“The	goal	of	the	competition	state,”	he	
maintains,	 “is	not	 the	advancement	of	democracy,	but	rather	 that	of	 in‐












































significant	 changes	 in	 the	 organization,	 funding,	 and	 orientation	 of	 re‐







































the	 latent	 contradictions	 between	 democracy	 and	 capitalism.	However,	
they	maintain,	it	is	not	that	democracy	and	capitalism	are,	by	definition,	



















faced	by	states	 in	 the	global	South	 in	 their	attempts	 to	reach	a	balance	























a	 number	 of	 factors,	 including	 their	 global	 distribution,	 prevailing	 na‐
tional	and	international	geopolitics,	and	the	fact	that,	unlike	Japan,	Singa‐








argument	 that	 economic	 development	 is	 a	 precondition	 for	 the	 emer‐















ideals	 of	 a	 social	 democracy	 than	 it	 is	 to	 the	 state‐centric	 East	 Asian	
model.	In	other	words	a	democratic	developmental	state	is	recognizable	
more	by	 its	participatory	and	redistributive	character	 than	by	 its	state‐
driven	and	rapid	economic	growth,	a	point	made	by	Seekings	in	his	chap‐
ter	in	this	book.	According	to	Törnquist,	social	democratic	development	























key	 stakeholders	 (trade	 unions,	 citizens,	 civil	 society	 organization,	 and	









South	 Africa,	 however,	 which	 have	 large	 populations	 differentiated	 by	
class,	race,	ethnicity,	and	religion,	the	prospects	of	forging	a	broad	social	
compact	are	 infinitely	more	 challenging.5	Even	among	 those	mobilizing	















5		 It	perhaps	comes	as	no	surprise	 that	Botswana	and	Mauritius,	 the	 two	African	


















have	 demonstrated,	 despite	 their	 promise,	 the	 successes	 of	 citizen	 in‐
volvement	in	participatory	budgeting	and	in	decision	making	in	local	wel‐
fare	programs,	are	not	sustainable	if	they	are	not	transformed	into	a	uni‐





























































The	 chapters	 in	 this	 book	 suggest	 that	 despite	 the	 ambitions	 and	
rhetoric	of	their	ruling	parties,	the	establishment	of	democratic	develop‐
mental	states	in	the	global	South	is	neither	path	determined	nor	inevita‐

































work,	might	 need	 to	 precede	 the	 establishment	 of	 such	 compacts.	 It	 is	
through	the	struggles	for	such	basic	rights,	they	believe,	that	the	alliances	






























Rueschemeyer,	 D.	 Stephens,	 E.,	 and	 Stephens,	 J.	 (1992).	 Capitalist	 development	 and	
democracy.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press	
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1		 These	countries,	also	referred	to	as	the	“Asian	tigers,”	are	Japan,	Taiwan,	Singa‐
pore,	and	South	Korea.	Hong	Kong	is	also	classified	as	an	East	Asian	development	
success	 story,	 yet	 the	 literature	 treats	 Hong	 Kong	 as	 an	 outlier	 in	 terms	 of	 a	
“nearly	laissez‐faire”	approach	to	economic	growth.	See	Page	(1994).	
42		TERESITA	CRUZ‐DEL	ROSARIO	
I	 amplify	 the	 discussion	 on	 the	 original	 “Asian	 Dragons,”	 namely,	
South	Korea	and	Taiwan,	both	of	which	entered	a	democratic	phase	fol‐
lowing	 their	economic	 “take‐off.”	The	characterization	of	 the	Singapore	




democracy”	 (Mutalib	 2000:	 313),	 a	 categorization	 it	 shares	with	 other	
Southeast	 Asian	 countries	 such	 as	 Cambodia,	 Malaysia,	 Vietnam,	 and,	
more	recently,	Thailand.	Despite	a	range	of	inhibitory	factors,	I	argue	that	






The Developmental State and Its East Asian Prototypes 


































Wade	 (1990:	 9),	 the	 developmental	 state	 is	 quite	 simply	 the	 “plan	 ra‐












tribution	program	 in	 Japan,	 the	effect	of	which	was	 to	 create	a	 socially	









infrastructure	 necessary	 for	 the	 rapid	 expansion	 of	 economic	 activity	
(McGuinn	et	al.	1979).	
The	historical	context	in	which	the	developmental	state	emerged	in	








































moted	positive	development—one	 that	 required	strong,	 state‐led	spon‐
sorship	of	business	investment	in	strategic	sectors	in	order	to	maximize	
returns	 in	 an	 environment	 where	 financial	 resources	 were	 scarce.	 In	





























Authoritarianism and the Hybrid State 
Scholars	have	expressed	their	concerns	with	the	predominant	authoritar‐
ian	 character	of	most	East	Asian	developmental	 states	 (White	1998:	5;	
Fritz	and	Menocal	2007:	537;	Vu	2007:	30,	among	others).	In	that	respect,	











































been	a	 feature	of	 the	Thai	state	as	 it	has	experienced	eleven	successful	
coups	and	seven	attempted	coups	since	1932.2	The	hybrid	regime	typol‐
ogy	 is	of	 interest	because	 it	enables	the	tracking	of	 trends	within	 these	
states,	but	also	because	it	moves	the	debate	beyond	a	simple	authoritar‐
ian‐democracy	binary.	
                                                 
2		 Fisher	(2013).	
48		TERESITA	CRUZ‐DEL	ROSARIO	





































dergoing	 the	 arduous	process	of	 building	 stable	 institutions	 capable	of	




































democracy”	and	a	much	stronger	role	 for	 the	monarchy	 in	steering	 the	
affairs	of	the	nation.4	












prospects	of	 establishing	a	developmental	 state,	 let	 alone	a	democratic	
one,	 seem	 questionable,	 and	 the	 country	 seems	 set	 to	 continue	 on	 a	
                                                 
4		 “Thai	Protesters	Issue	a	Call	for	Less”,	The	International	New	York	Times.	13	De‐
cember	2013.	









(ibid:	 17–18)	 enumerate	 the	 following:	 the	 persistence	 of	 clientelistic	
structures;	high	expectations	among	the	citizenry	that	result	in	collective	
frustration	over	the	slow	or	nondelivery	of	public	goods	and	services;	cor‐
ruption;	 elite	domination	 in	political	 affairs	 and	especially	during	 elec‐
tions;	and	an	all‐around	lack	of	state	capacity	to	deliver	quick	results	on	
the	promises	of	democracy.	The	example	of	 the	popular	uprising	 in	 the	
Philippines	in	1986	and	the	ensuing	attempts	by	a	faction	of	the	military	
to	unseat	President	Corazon	Aquino	serve	to	illustrate	the	perils	of	a	dem‐
ocratic	 transition	and	the	difficulties	 faced	 in	pursuing	a	path	of	demo‐















direction	 of	more	 competitive	 electoral	 authoritarianism.	However,	 fol‐






























compete	 in	 elections.	 This	 ensures	 that	 the	 PAP	 puts	 forward	 only	 the	






motion	of	 public	 participation	 in	 nonpolitical	 activities	 (e.g.,	 convening	
regular	meetings	with	members	of	the	public	and	welfare	societies),	and	
increasing	 the	party’s	 overall	 responsiveness	 to	 the	 citizenry.	More	 au‐













ist,	 became	 South	 Korea’s	 first	 president	 in	 1948.	 He	 is	 credited	 with	
building	the	developmental	state	through	“an	extremely	repressive	anti‐
Communist	political	system,	which	effectively	guaranteed	long‐term	state	















enced	 political	 turbulence	 as	 demands	 for	 political	 participation	 esca‐
lated.	 Following	 the	 appointment	 of	 Chun	Doo	Hwan	 (another	military	
general)	in	September	1980,7	state‐led	development	continued	but	it	was	






conglomerates)	 that	 had	 gained	 prominence	 during	 the	 period	 of	 eco‐
nomic	takeoff	and	that	had	now	succeeded	in	building	international	net‐
works	 that	 extended	 their	 reach	 beyond	 South	 Korea.	 This	meant	 that	




1981,	 big	 business	 was	 clamoring	 for	 less	 state	 intervention	 and	 this	
stance	is	reflected	in	the	annual	report	of	the	Federation	of	Korean	Indus‐
tries	which	read:	




















mocracy,	 ending	 an	 era	 of	 almost	 four	 decades	 of	 authoritarian	 rule	 in	
South	Korea.	Multiparty	elections	took	place	in	December	1987	and	since	
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groups	 resembling	 the	Korean	 chaebols.	 The	 absence	 of	 big	 businesses	
had	implications	for	the	formation	of	labour	unions	that	did	not	develop	
autonomously	as	had	done	in	Korea,	but	rather	were	co‐opted	and	inte‐
grated	 into	the	KMT	party	structure.	As	a	result,	a	 labour	movement	 in	
Taiwan	never	flourished	and	trade	unions	never	provided	a	backbone	of	
support	to	the	pro‐democracy	movement	as	had	been	the	case	in	South	




rights),	 but	 rather	 around	 the	 equitable	 distribution	 of	 political	 power	
among	ethnic	groups.	Activists	 for	democracy	were	predominantly	Tai‐
wanese,	and	their	pro‐democracy	struggles	were	focused	on	issues	of	na‐
tional	 identity	 and	 claims	 to	 self‐determination	 (Wong	 2003:	 246).	 In	
later	years,	as	Taiwan’s	democracy	deepened,	competitive	politics	would	
incorporate	progressive	issues	related	to	social	welfare,	and	these	were	
                                                 
8		 For	 an	 extensive	 discussion	 of	 South	 Korea’s	 democratic	 transition	 from	 the	


















uted	 land	 to	 small	 farmers	 and	 broken	 up	wealth	 concentration	 in	 the	
landowning	classes,	neither	country	encountered	resistance	from	landed	
interests	 at	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 development	 decade	 in	 the	 1960s	 (Ranis	
1995:	 512).	 One	 of	 the	 positive	 results	 of	 land	 redistribution	 was	 the	
emergence	of	rural	entrepreneurs	whose	livelihoods	were	derived	from	a	












eration	 of	 problems	 has	 emerged	 in	 South	Korea	 and	Taiwan.	 For	 one,	
pork	barrel	politics,	characteristic	of	many	competitive	electoral	systems,	
undermine	the	political	party	system.	In	Taiwan,	what	has	been	termed	







record	 of	 growth.”	 The	 globally	 televised	 parliamentary	 fist	 fights	 be‐
















package	of	 rescue	reforms	underwritten	by	 the	 International	Monetary	
Fund	converted	what	had	been	a	limited	developmental	state	of	the	1980s	
into	a	neoliberal	regime	in	the	1990s	and	thereafter.	This	neoliberal	trans‐
formation	 of	 the	 Korean	 economy,	 argues	 Koo	 (2007),	 is	 the	 “major	
source(s)	 of	 increasing	 income	 inequality.”	 Wealth	 inequality	 is	 even	
sharper	than	income	inequality.	According	to	Koo	(ibid),	the	top	10%	of	
the	population	owned	46%	of	the	country’s	total	wealth,	while	the	bottom	









Building a Democratic Developmental State 
The	historical	experiences	of	East	Asia	demonstrate	that	developmental	















sliding	 perilously	 close	 to	 authoritarianism	 since	 President	 Rodrigo	
Duterte	assumed	office	in	June	2016.	
Despite	the	pitfalls	of	transitions,	White	(1998:	64)	argues,	“external	


























and	 implications	 of	 East	 Asian	 Interventionism.	 In:	 L.	 Low	 (Ed.),	
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The Carrot and Stick of Ethiopian “Democratic 










ritius,	 Botswana,	 South	 Africa,	 and	 Brazil	 (Leftwich	 1996;	 Sandbrook	
2005;	Edigheji	2010;	Evans	and	Heller	2013),	and	the	debate	has	largely	
revolved	around	the	extent	to	which	they	have	resolved	the	inherent	con‐















                                                 
1		 This	chapter	 focuses	primarily	on	 the	Ethiopian	political‐economy	up	until	 the	
May	2015	elections.	Political	developments	that	have	taken	place	subsequent	to	







lysts	 argue	 that,	 notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	multiparty	 elections	 are	
regularly	held,	the	ruling	regime	has	become	increasingly	more	authori‐
tarian	and	oppressive,	and	there	has	been	a	progressive	erosion	of	civil	



























                                                 




















































has	yet	 to	be	achieved,	 let	alone	 for	 it	 to	be	consolidated	(Kefale	2011;	







itics	 for	 two	key	reasons.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 they	 took	place	during	a	
period	of	unprecedented	liberalization	in	the	political	sphere	which	ena‐
bled	the	opposition	to	win	a	number	of	seats	in	both	the	federal	and	re‐
gional	 parliaments.	 In	 the	 second,	 the	 post‐election	 crisis	 and	 violence	
which	 followed	 the	elections	enabled	 the	 ruling	party	 to	 strengthen	 its	
grip	 on	 power	 through	 various	 legal	 and	 political	 means.	 As	 a	 conse‐




played	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 democratic	 developmental	 states,	 Leftwich	



















which	 had	 to	 be	 controlled	 or	 conciliated…”	 facilitated	 the	 relatively	
smooth	progression	toward	the	establishment	of	dominant	party	regimes	
(ibid:65).	 The	 significant	 success	 achieved	 by	 these	 parties,	 he	 asserts,	
may,	in	no	small	measure,	be	ascribed	to	their	ability	to	resolve	the	struc‐
tural	contradictions	that	exist	between	democracy	and	development	and,	
























a	 developmental	 state	within	 the	 broader	 notion	 of	 “political	 develop‐
ment.”	In	this	conceptualization,	political	development	is	a	long‐term	pro‐





















































of	 the	country	and	to	 transform	the	country	 into	a	“multi‐foundational,	



















































































tion	of	 a	democratic	developmental	 state,	 the	discussion	which	 follows	
looks	at	the	ideology	which	underpins	the	political	outlook	of	the	ruling	
EPRDF.	
The EPRDF’s Revolutionary Democracy Ideology 
In	June	1993,	two	years	after	it	had	seized	power,	the	EPRDF	published	a	
policy	 document,	 entitled	Our	 Revolutionary	Democracy	Objectives	 and	
Next	Steps,	which	declared	that	its	future	policies	would	be	guided	by	the	





















masses	 from	 the	 shackles	 of	Western	 imperialism	 and	 from	 the	 domi‐
nance	of	 the	 local	 “oppressive	 class”	 (EPRDF	1993:	1).	Two	broad	eco‐
nomic	objectives	were	also	identified	and	these	related	to	the	need	to	es‐






The	 ideologues	 of	 revolutionary	 democracy	 dismissed	 “liberal	 de‐
mocracy”	for	its	emphasis	on	electoral	representation	which	provided	lit‐

























that	 ensures	 legitimate	 superiority	 by	 winning	 all	 regular	 elections	
through	continuous	popular	support	to	govern	the	country.	Losing	even	










structuring	both	 the	 federal	 and	 regional	 governments	 in	 line	with	 the	
thinking	of	 revolutionary	democracy	(ibid:	56).	This	assault	on	officials	
opposed	to	the	new	ideology	(now	labeled	enemies)	in	what	has	been	de‐
















cial	 institutions,	 such	 as	 community‐based	 organizations,	 and	 religious	
and	educational	institutions	have	also	been	targeted	as	vehicles	through	









sence	of	 the	concept	has	been	contested	 in	struggles	which	have	 led	to	
schisms	within	the	party.	According	to	Gebru	Asrat,	a	veteran	of	the	TPLF	
who	left	the	party	in	2001,	there	had	long	been	ideological	ambiguity	in	
the	 discourses	 and	 practices	 of	 revolutionary	 democracy	 within	 the	


















































tains	 that	 the	 revolutionary	 democracy	 has	 passed	 through	 different	
phases	and	has	evolved	from	being	an	“ideological	strategy”	to	becoming	
“a	codified	discursive	strategy”	(Bach	2011:	649).	The	discursive	strategy	












accusations	 of	 human	 rights	 groups	 and	 organizations	 advocating	 for	




the	 developmental	 program	 underway	 and	 the	 demonstrable	 welfare	
benefits	which	it	is	bringing	to	the	Ethiopian	people	(EPRDF	2010:	3–15;	
Bach	2011:	655).	The	section	which	follows	considers	the	shift	in	EPRDF	
policy	 from	 revolutionary	democracy	 to	developmental	 democracy	and	
discusses	the	continuity	and	discontinuity	in	the	discourse	and	strategies	
than	underpin	them.	





























rural	masses	which	 it	 considers	 its	primary	 constituents	 (ibid:	 55–57).	
However,	the	party	argues,	due	to	changing	national	and	geopolitical	con‐
































tionary	democracy.	 Furthermore,	 the	political	 processes	 seen	as	neces‐
sary	to	ensure	the	hegemony	of	developmentalism	are	exactly	the	same	as	










































































































peace,	 poverty	 reduction	 and	 development”	 (Proclamation	 No.	
715/2011).	In	the	same	year,	the	government	issued	a	proclamation	in‐
troducing	a	 social	 insurance	 scheme	 (Proclamation	No.	690/2010)	and	
another	to	pilot	a	Community	Based	Health	Insurance	program	in	selected	











































been	 incorporated	 into	 the	 government’s	 political	 and	 developmental	
program.	
                                                 
























dissent,	 the	 institutional	 and	 structural	 distinction	 between	 the	 ruling	
party	and	 the	 state	has	been	effectively	eliminated	and	 the	undisputed	










                                                 
5		 Among	 the	 legal	 instruments	 used	 by	 the	 government	 to	 consolidate	 its	



















egies	 and	 in	 the	 authoritarian	 and	 undemocratic	 nature	 of	 the	 politi‐
colegal	 system.	From	this,	 three	 interrelated	conclusions	can	be	drawn.	














                                                 
6		 For	example,	a	number	of	documentaries	have	been	released	which	target	Muslim	
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The Establishment of a Democratic Developmental Local State 




























tributes	of	 the	classical	developmental	 state,	 that	 is,	being	autonomous	
and	coherent,	but	(which)	also	takes	on	board	the	attributes	of	procedural	




tion	 in	 the	 governance	 and	 transformation	 processes.”	 To	 that	 extent,	
there	is	some	consensus	in	the	literature	that	a	democratic	developmental	




































its	 conceptual	 vagueness	 or	 perhaps	 because	 the	 term	 democracy	 has	
positive	associations	in	both	the	national	and	international	realms,	there	
is	a	significant	degree	of	self‐labeling,	where	states	ascribe	to	themselves	






















conditions.	 In	 doing	 so	 its	 guidelines	 will	 remain	 the	 basic	 people‐
driven	principles	of	the	RDP.	(RSA	1994,	Sections	3.1.2	and	3.1.3)	







ments	 (ANC	2005,	 2007b)	 as	well	 in	 official	 discourse	 (PSC	2008;	The	
Presidency	2009,	2010;	Poon	2009).	The	concept	received	new	impetus	
following	the	global	financial	meltdown	in	2008,	which	exposed	the	weak‐




erty	 and	 social	 inequality,	 to	 improve	 service	 delivery,	 and	 to	 promote	
people‐centered	development	(Manuel	2009;	ANC	2009;	Edigheji	2010).	
Significantly,	 official	 South	 African	 understanding	 of	 a	 developmental	
state	(in	as	much	as	it	has	been	formally	articulated)	is	one	that	is	both	
developmental	 and	democratic	 (Olayode	2005;	Van	Dijk	and	Croucamp	




























public	 (including	 all	 spheres	 of	 government)	 and	private	 investment	


















discussed,	 little	 thought	was	 given	 to	 how	 greater	 citizen	participation	




the	 Integrated	Development	 Planning	 (IDP)	 process	 (Achmat	 2002).	 In	
terms	of	the	Municipal	Systems	Act	of	2000,	an	IDP	must	be	drawn	up	fol‐
lowing	municipal	 elections	and	 the	assumption	of	office	of	 a	new	 local	










“cornerstone	 of	 developmental	 government	 in	 South	 Africa”	 and	 the	


















































The Coherency of the Developmental State Vision 
Constitutionally,	South	Africa	is	a	unitary	state	with	a	three‐tiered	hierar‐
chy	 of	 national,	 provincial,	 and	 local	 governments.	 However,	 since	 the	
adoption	of	a	democratic	constitution	in	1996,	the	government	has	strug‐
                                                 
1		 Data	 presented	 in	 this	 chapter	 are	 derived	 from	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	
research	 conducted	 in	 Delft	 between	 January	 2011	 and	 October	 2013.The	
qualitative	research	 included	observation,	key	 informant	 interviews,	 and	 focus	
group	 discussions	with	municipal	 and	 provincial	 officials,	 local	 political	 office	
bearers,	 ward	 committee	 members,	 and	 other	 residents	 of	 the	 area.	 The	
quantitative	data	generated	were	derived	from	a	stratified	random	sample	of	470	


























management	 and	 skills	 development	 programme.	 The	 City	 will	 also	
contribute	to	the	creation	of	a	capable	and	developmental	state	through	









































stood	and	the	diversity	 in	wards	 is	not	understood.	Emotional	 forces	
and	the	political	landscape	play	a	major	role.	If	one	goes	into	the	com‐
munity	we	can	see	what	the	real	needs	of	people	are.	We	cannot	prede‐
termine	 this.	We	must	 really	 listen	 to	 the	 people,	 not	 the	 other	way	
around.	We	are	not	doing	this	at	grassroots	level.	If	we	do	not	deal	with	














plan	represents	not	only	a	blueprint	of	 the	city’s	vision	but	 that	“It	 is	a	
plan	that	belongs	to	all	the	people	of	our	city,	who	have	all	been	given	the	
opportunity	to	have	their	say	in	how	we	move	Cape	Town	forward”(City	
of	 Cape	 Town	 2016).	 However,	 when	 asked	 to	 comment	 on	 their	

















                                                 
3		 Of	 those	 interviewed	 in	 the	city’s	2011	Customer	Satisfaction	Survey	91%	had	
never	heard	of	the	IDP	(City	of	Cape	Town	2011:57).	










monitoring	 service	 delivery,	 expenditure	 of	 funding	 allocated	 to	 the	
































ward	 committee	 members	 travel	 through	 a	 similarly	 circuitous	 route	
through	the	ward	committee,	and	by	way	of	the	ward	councilor	to	the	sub‐
council,	and	then	on	to	the	council	where	decisions	of	substance	are	ulti‐




































and	really	 try	to	make	a	difference,	others	do	 just	 the	absolute	mini‐
mum.	(Female	Councilor,	Bonteheuwel:	20/09/2012)	
It	is	also	evident	that	there	are	very	unequal	power	relations	between	the	
















Developmental Local Government and the Means to Improved 
Welfare 
A	key	element	of	all	developmental	states	has	been	their	ability	to	pro‐
mote	 sustained	 economic	 growth	 and,	 thereby,	 to	 improve	 the	 living	
standards	of	their	citizens.	The	advocates	of	a	democratic	developmental	
state	also	aspire	to	this	goal,	albeit	through	more	inclusive	and	democratic	





















The	 South	 African	 notion	 of	 developmental	 local	 government	was	
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The “Developmental” and “Welfare” State in South Africa 
Jeremy	Seekings	
Introduction 
Enthusiasm	for	the	 idea	of	a	“developmental	state”	 in	South	Africa	 first	
emerged	in	the	early	1990s,	in	the	lead‐up	to	the	first	democratic	elections	
in	1994	and	since	 then	 it	has	ebbed	and	 flowed	 in	 the	 intervening	 two	
decades.	 The	 incoming	 African	 National	 Congress	 (ANC)	 government,	
with	Nelson	Mandela	as	president,	inherited	an	economy	characterized	by	
very	high	inequality,	with	deep	poverty—unmatched	in	other	comparable	
middle‐income	economies—coexisting	with	 conspicuous	 affluence.	 The	
ANC	leadership	repeatedly	committed	itself	to	transforming	the	economic	























employment	 rate	 (close	 to	40%,	 if	we	 include	 the	 “discouraged”	unem‐
ployed	who	want	work	but	have	given	up	looking	for	it)	is	matched	out‐






ties	generated	 in	markets	 than	 it	has	at	governing	markets	 so	as	 to	 re‐





























The Promise of Development in Democratic South Africa 
In	its	1994	Reconstruction	and	Development	Programme	(RDP),	the	ANC	

























ecommunications,	 transport,	 health,	 education	 and	 training	 for	 all	 our	
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“central	 and	 driving	 force	 of	 a	 programme	 of	 rural	 development”	 that	
would	generate	“large‐scale	employment”	and	raise	rural	incomes	(ibid:	




The	 industrial	 policy	 agenda	 was	 developed	 through	 the	 union‐
linked	Industrial	Strategy	Project	(ISP)	in	the	early	1990s.	The	ISP	recom‐
mended	 that	 the	poor	performance	of	South	Africa’s	manufacturing	 in‐
dustries	 be	 rectified	 through	 higher	 productivity	 and	 moving	 “up	 the	
value	chain”	(Joffe	et	al.	1995).	The	ISP’s	recommendations	meshed	with	
unions’	demands	for	higher	wages,	resulting	 in	the	use	of	 labor	market	
and	 industrial	 policies	 to	 raise	 productivity	 through	 higher	 (“decent”)	
wages,	 skills	 development,	 and	 the	 upgrading	 of	 industrial	 processes	
(which	in	practice	mostly	meant	mechanization).	












embraced	 the	 discourse	 of	 development—including	 the	 short‐lived	 ap‐















dorsed	by	 the	ANC	at	 its	National	General	Council	 in	2005,	 its	national	
policy	 conference	 in	mid‐2007,	 and	 at	 its	National	 Conference	 in	 Polo‐
kwane	at	the	end	of	2007.	The	2006	Accelerated	and	Shared	Growth	Ini‐
tiative	South	Africa	envisaged	the	developmental	state	accelerating	and	
reshaping	 growth	 so	 that	 unemployment	 and	 poverty	 would	 halve	 by	
2014	(South	Africa	2006b).	By	2007,	 the	call	 for	a	developmental	state	
had	been	 taken	up	by	 the	 coalition	behind	 Jacob	Zuma’s	 successful	 re‐
moval	of	Mbeki	as	ANC	leader	and	president,	and	the	developmental	state	










mental	 state—to	keep	 the	electricity	on—has	not	been	achieved”	 (Fine	
2010:	178;	see	further	Styan	2015).	Economic	growth	was	slow	in	relation	







also	 clearly	 failed	 to	 steer	 the	 economy	down	a	more	 inclusive	 growth	
path.	Between	1994	and	2012,	the	unemployment	rate	rose	by	at	least	5	










institutions	performed	unevenly	 and	often	 poorly	 (ibid:	 54).	What	was	









straints	 on	 inclusive	 economic	 growth	 with	 continuing	 indecision	 and	
caution	 in	 its	 proposals	 for	 tackling	 these	 constraints.	 The	 point	 to	 be	
made	now	is	a	simpler	one:	After	eighteen	years	in	government,	the	ANC’s	
major	policy	document	suggested	that	the	economy	had	not	only	grown	








The Failure of the Developmental State 
The	democratic	state’s	failure	to	steer	the	economy	down	the	desired	eco‐
nomic	growth	path	has	often	been	explained	in	terms	of	the	external	con‐
straints	 of	 international	 agreements	 in	 a	 globalized	world,	 the	political	
character	of	 the	ANC,	 and	 the	 incapacity	of	 the	 South	African	 state.	All	
three	arguments	are	well‐founded,	but	incomplete.	








for	 key	 industries	while	 avoiding	 the	dangers	of	 inefficiency	by	 linking	
subsidies	and	related	support	to	good	export	performance.	South	Africa	
implemented	a	similar	 industrial	policy	 for	 the	motor	 industry,	making	
subsidies	conditional	on	export	performance.	Such	subsidies	ceased	to	be	
legal,	however,	under	the	2000	international	Agreement	on	Subsidies	and	





Kaplan—who	was	 integral	 to	 the	 ISP	and	between	2000	and	2003	




























more	 vulnerable	 to	 corruption	 and	 mismanagement,	 as	 investigations	









































portunities	rather	 than	doing	their	 job,	but	 their	actual	performance	 in	



















municipalities	 failed	 to	 ensure	 adequate	 quality,	 squandered	 resources	
through	incompetence	or	corruption,	and	were	completely	unable	to	play	
the	developmental	 roles	 imagined	 in	national	policy.	Widespread	prob‐
lems	 included	 “stalemates	 between	 councils	 and	 officials;	 rivalries	 be‐
tween	mayors	and	municipal	managers;	tensions	between	senior	and	jun‐
ior	 staff;	 a	 loss	 of	moral	 and	 an	 ethic	 of	 service	 delivery	 amongst	 staff	
members;	convoluted	procedures	and	red	tape;	and	the	appointment	of	
staff	 with	 inadequate	 formal	 qualifications,	 expertise	 and	 experience.”	
Rapid	 transformation	 had	 undermined	 municipal	 capacity:	 “Valuable	
skills	 had	 been	 lost,	 institutional	 memory	 had	 been	 dissipated,	 senior	
posts	had	become	sinecures	 for	 the	party	 faithful	and	 junior	posts	had	











them	well.	 It	 also	 disciplined	 companies	 in	 a	 range	 of	 ways,	 including	
through	Black	Economic	Empowerment	(BEE)	legislation.	The	state	also	
































member	 Rob	 Davies,	 introduced	 a	 new	 Industrial	 Policy	 Action	 Pro‐
gramme	(IPAP),	described	by	the	SACP	as	“a	critical	component	of	chang‐
ing	our	present	semi‐colonial	capitalist	growth	path.”	Davies	and	his	cab‐
















The Flawed Design of the Developmental State 
An	alternative	interpretation	of	the	failure	of	the	developmental	state	in	
South	Africa,	 in	terms	of	 its	 failure	 to	achieve	 inclusive	development	or	
growth,	focuses	on	the	design	of	the	project.	It	was	the	adoption	of	an	ill‐












between	 intensified	 international	competition	(primarily	due	 to	 the	ex‐
traordinary	expansion	of	Chinese	production)	and	rising	domestic	costs.	


























































tic	 South	 African	market.	 Consumers	 benefited	 from	 sharply	 declining	
clothes	prices,	but	employment	plummeted.	The	Minister	of	Trade	and	In‐



































intensive	manufacturing	 because	 the	 cost	 structure	 is	 too	 high,	 the	 ex‐
change	rate	is	too	volatile,	infrastructure	is	inadequate	and	the	skills	base	
















The Unexpected Successes of the Welfare State 
The	NDP	also	recognized	that	improving	living	standards	depended	also	
on	“a	social	wage	and	good‐quality	public	services”	(ibid:	26).	The	NDP	








on	both	clearly	 ideological	grounds	 (“handouts”	 created	 “dependency”)	
and	supposedly	fiscal	ones	(were	these	programs	“sustainable”	in	the	long	
term?).	But	 the	 strong	 evidence	 that	 the	 expansion	of	 social	 assistance	
































to	meet	 their	own	needs,	 through	 “the	development	of	human	capacity	
and	self‐reliance,”	 rather	 than	relying	on	 the	state	 (South	Africa	1997).	
The	Minister	of	Welfare,	Geraldine	Fraser‐Moleketsi,	revealingly	told	par‐




























son	 Joel	 Netshitenzhe	 said	 that	 able‐bodied	 adults	 should	 not	 receive	
“handouts”	but	should	rather	be	helped	to	“enjoy	the	opportunity,	the	dig‐




























not	been	 true	 initially,	when	 the	administration	of	pensions	and	grants	
was	the	responsibility	of	provincial	governments.	In	2002,	the	press	re‐
ported	that	120	people	were	bringing	high	court	claims	each	week	against	







absent	 or	 delinquent,	 treating	 the	 public	 with	 contempt.	 More	 than	
10,000	state	officials	were	also	implicated	in	fraudulent	claims.	In	the	face	
of	repeated	embarrassments,	especially	in	the	Eastern	Cape,	a	centralized	
South	African	Social	 Security	Agency	 (SASSA)	was	 established	 in	2004.	






























































poor	people,	 but	not	 tied	 to	 specific	behaviors—had	spread	 to	most	of	
South	 Africa’s	 neighbors.	 Namibia	 has	 old‐age	 pensions	 and	 disability	
grants,	as	well	as	a	limited	child	grant	programs.	Old‐age	pensions	were	












These	 emerging	welfare	 states,	 built	 around	 social	 assistance	pro‐
grams,	 are	 crucial	 to	 combating	 poverty,	 and	 the	 experience	 of	 Nordic	
countries	 (as	 well	 as	 Britain	 and	 Britain’s	 overseas	 dominions)	 in	 the	
early	 twentieth	 century	 is	 instructive	here.	But	 critics	 of	welfare	 state‐







training	 the	unemployed	 to	 facilitate	economic	 restructuring.2	 In	South	
Africa,	developmental	policies	prioritized	productivity	over	employment,	
and	social	grants	provided	an	extensive	but	nonetheless	inadequate	safety	
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Barrientos,	Armando,	and	Santibáñez,	Claudio.	(2009).	New	forms	of	social	assistance	
and	 the	 evolution	 of	 social	 protection	 in	 Latin	 America.	 Journal	 of	 Latin	
American	Studies,	41,	1–26.	




Devereux,	 Stephen,	 Adato,	 Michelle,	 Sabates‐Wheeler,	 Rachel,	 McConnell,	 Jesse	 and	
Becker,	Elisabeth.	 (2011).	Child	Support	Grant	Evaluation	2010:	Qualitative	
research	 report.	 Pretoria:	 UNICEF,	 with	 the	 South	 African	 Department	 of	
Social	Development	and	South	African	Social	Security	Agency.	
Evans,	 Peter.	 (1995).	 Embedded	 autonomy:	 States	 and	 industrial	 transformation.	
Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press.	







Fourie,	 Elsje.	 (2014).	Model	 students:	 Policy	 emulation,	modernization,	 and	 Kenya’s	
Vision	2030.	African	Affairs,	113(453),	540–562.	











Joffe,	 Avril,	 Kaplan,	 David,	 Kaplinsky,	 Raphael	 and	 Lewis,	 David.	 (1995).	 Improving	
manufacturing	performance	in	South	Africa:	Report	of	the	industrial	strategy	
project.	Cape	Town:	University	of	Cape	Town	Press.	




OECD	 Social,	 Employment	 and	 Migration	 Working	 Papers	 no.101.	 Paris:	
Organisation	for	Economic	Co‐operation	and	Development.	
Makgetla,	Neva	Seidman.	(2007).	Local	government	budgets	and	development:	A	tale	of	
two	 towns.	 In:	 Sakhela	 Buhlungu,	 John	 Daniel,	 Roger	 Southall	 and	 Jessica	





income	grant	 for	South	Africa	 (pp.	 56–76).	 Cape	Town:	University	 of	 Cape	
Town	Press.	
Meth,	 Charles.	 (2004).	 Ideology	 and	 social	 policy:	 “Handouts”	 and	 the	 spectre	 of	
“dependency”.	Transformation,	56,	1‐30.	
Naidoo,	Vinothan.	(2008).	Assessing	racial	redress	in	the	public	service.	In:	Adam	Habib	
and	 Christina	 Bentley	 (Eds.),	Racial	 redress	and	 citizenship	 in	South	Africa	
(pp.	99–128).	Cape	Town:	Human	Sciences	Research	Council	Press.	






—–	and	—–.	 (2016).	 Trade	unions,	 casino	 capitalism	and	 the	 state	 in	 South	Africa’s	
clothing	industry.	Review	of	African	Political	Economy,43(167),	89–106.	
Seekings,	Jeremy,	and	Matisonn,	Heidi.	(2012).	The	continuing	politics	of	basic	income	in	
South	 Africa.	 In:	 Carol	 Pateman	 and	 Matthew	 Murray	 (Eds.),	 Horizons	 of	
reform:	Basic	income	solutions	around	the	world.	London:	Palgrave	Macmillan.	
—–	 and	Nattrass,	Nicoli.	 (2015).	Policy,	politics	and	poverty	 in	South	Africa.	London:	
Palgrave	Macmillan.	




























social	 security:	How	 international	 organizations	defined	 the	 field	of	 social	
cash	transfers	in	the	2000s.Journal	of	Social	Policy,	available	on	CJO	2015	doi:	
10.1017/S0047279415000720.	

























































2012:	 45).	 Second,	 he	 encouraged	 collaboration	 between	 the	 working	
class	and	capitalists,	a	process	driven	by	the	government	to	avoid	any	pos‐















subsequent	 campaign	 for	 the	 presidency	 in	 2010,	 the	 concept	 of	 neo‐
desenvolvimentismo	became	a	common	refrain	in	their	ideological	and	po‐
litical	agenda.	It	also	underpinned	a	concerted	effort	to	eradicate	the	rad‐
                                                 
1		 A	few	months	later,	President	Vargas	committed	suicide.	This	was	apparently	due	
to	the	passing	of	the	Petrobras	law,	which	was	considered	to	be	a	“communist”	







From Petismo to Lulismo: The Development of Democracy 
The	concept	of	petismo	derives	from	the	alliance	of	various	working‐class	
fractions	and	social	movements,	which	was	forged	in	the	1980s	to	create	













































































































lar,	 there	were	concerns	 that	 they	exercised	 little	 influence	over	eco‐
nomic	and	financial	policies,	which	were	either	a	continuation	of	 the	
policies	 of	 the	 previous	 neoliberal	 president,	 F.H.	 Cardosos,	 or	 they	



















Lulismo and the Apparent Success of “New Developmentalism” 
Although	Lula	da	Silva	was	twice	elected	president	of	Brazil,	in	his	second	
term,	which	began	in	2006,	his	PT	lost	almost	20	million	votes	from	the	
better‐off	 organized	 working	 and	 middle	 classes	 in	 the	 southeast	 and	





Transformation of the Society: The Subproletariat 
















































he	 secured	 their	 acceptance	 of	 gradual	 and	 cautious	 social	 reform,	 fi‐
nanced	by	improved	tax	collection	and	economic	growth	rather	than	by	a	
zero‐sum	method	 of	 redistribution	 from	 the	 rich	 to	 the	 poor.	 In	 other	
words,	lulismo	combined	“gradual	reforms”	for	the	poor	and	“conservative	
pacts”	with	 the	rich.	Montero	(2005)	and	other	political	scientists	have	
described	 “reforms	 under	 oligarchic‐conservative	 control”	 as	 the	 main	
characteristic	of	Brazilian	politics	after	the	introduction	of	the	new	dem‐
ocratic	 constitution	 in	1988.	Although	Singer	 recognizes	 that	 there	 is	a	
considerable	degree	of	policy	continuity	between	the	governments	of	Fer‐
nando	Henrique	Cardoso	(1995–2002)	and	that	of	Lula	(2003–2010),	es‐






                                                 
2		 Although	usually	unemployed	or	underemployed,	the	subproletariat	in	industri‐
alizing	Brazil	is	not	entirely	excluded	from	the	labor	market.	This	distinguishes	




































































































torically	 had	had	 a	 low‐skilled	workforce	 and	what	 has	 been	 termed	 a	
“low	 skills	 equilibrium”	 (Schneider	 2013),	while	 the	 oil	 and	petroleum	
sector,	in	contrast,	is	skills	based	and	is	in	need	of	highly	skilled	workers.	
Over	the	course	of	the	past	half	century,	Brazil	has	embraced	various	




















prospect	 of	 long	 prison	 sentences.	 However,	 whether	 or	 not	 he	 serves	
time	in	prison,	Lula’s	entire	policy	legacy	has	been	widely	discredited	in	
the	media.	
Transformation of the Cities: The Mega Event Projects 
Encouraged	by	the	pro‐poor	policies	implemented	by	the	Lula	and	Dilma	
governments	 after	 2003,	 some	PT	office‐bearers	 sought	 to	 promote	 an	
agenda	for	“urban	reform”	as	a	complement	to	the	“agrarian	reform”	pol‐
icy	enshrined	in	the	1988	Constitution.	This	led	to	the	establishment	of	
the	 country’s	 first	Ministry	of	Cities,	which	was	headed	by	 the	 first	PT	
mayor	of	Porto	Alegre.	At	long	last,	in	a	country	where	84%	of	the	popu‐
lation	lives	in	urban	areas,	a	policy	was	formulated	to	bridge	the	divide	




















tems	 and	 optimal	 conditions	 for	 graft	 and	 the	maximization	 of	 profits	


































emergence	 of	 a	 new	 generation	 of	 urban	 movements	 which	 had	 been	























one	of	 the	 few	responses	 forthcoming	 from	the	president	and	 the	Con‐
gress,	which	most	probably	were	made	out	of	concern	for	the	forthcoming	
elections	 2014,	was	 to	 enact	 stronger	 anticorruption	 legislation.	 These	
laws	 gave	 police	 and	 prosecutors	 more	 powers	 to	 combat	 corruption,	
such	as	in	extended	phone	tapping,	temporary	imprisonment,	and	“plea	
























social	 movements.	 Confronted	 with	 this	 backlash,	 the	 president	 back‐
tracked	on	the	austerity	program,	but	in	so	doing	she	also	lost	the	support	
of	the	financial	markets.	Seeing	her	weakened	position,	her	political	op‐






policies	 that	were	 implemented	 in	 an	 authoritarian	way	without	wide‐









power	 through	 a	 parliamentary	 conspiracy	which	 amounted	 to	 a	 coup	
d’etat.	
It	remains	to	be	seen,	however,	whether	the	democratic	developmen‐
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voltará	 atrás).	 Interview	 in	 the	 weekly	 magazine	 Epoca,	 June,	 21	 2013.	
http://revistaepoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2013/06/andre‐singer‐ener	
gia‐social‐nao‐voltara‐atras.html		





















New Social Democracy in the South? Reflections from India, 










by	neoliberal	 economic	policies	 (including	 the	 growth	of	 private	 social	
services)	 that	nurture	an	 Indian	version	of	 the	American	dream.	 In	 the	
















                                                 
1		 The	author	wishes	to	acknowledge	vital	 importance	for	the	chapter	of	 joint	re‐



















ments	 that	 emerged	during	 the	period	of	 rapid	 industrialization	 in	 the	
















nesia,	 India,	 and	Scandinavia,	 in	particular,	 and	with	 reference	 to	other	
states	in	the	global	South	such	as	Brazil,	South	Africa,	and	the	Philippines.	
                                                 
2		 For	elaboration	of	these	dimensions,	see	Törnquist	with	Harriss	(2016).	
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These	 country	 cases	examine	different	 attempts	 to	 construct	 social	de‐
mocracy	over	a	period	of	three	generations,	along	with	their	limitations	









workers’	 management	 of	 industry.	 This	 proposition	 was	 derived	 from	








































Most	 popular	 participation	 in	 the	 postcolonial	 era,	 moreover,	 re‐
mained	indirect,	mediated	by	patrons	and	populist	leaders,	rather	than	by	
organizations	 appointed	 by	 the	 people	 themselves.3	 In	 contrast,	 com‐













                                                 
3		 Populism	may	be	delineated,	generally,	in	terms	of	anti‐elitism	and	supposedly	
direct	 relations	 between	 acclaimed	 leaders	 and	 a	 notoriously	 unspecified	
“people.”	
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citizen	 rights	were	 the	 library	and	 land	 reform	movements,	 along	with	
peasant	and	labor	organizations	that	balanced	the	influence	of	their	com‐
munist	party	leader.	From	the	mid‐1950s	onward,	however,	attempts	by	




of	 Kerala	 had	 developed	 in	 education	 and	 commercial	 agriculture,	 and	


















youth	 organizations,	 cooperative	 associations,	 and	 cultural	 and	 educa‐
tional	 groups.	 Increasingly,	 independent	 civil	 society	 associations,	 too,	
drew	closer	 to	politicians	and	parties.	As	a	consequence	of	 the	need	 to	
balance	the	interests	of	different	groups,	the	welfare	programs	and	poli‐
cies	adopted	were	often	chosen	on	a	partisan	basis,	irrespective	of	their	






















even	engaged	 in	 land	speculation.	 In	addition,	 the	reforms	were	 imple‐
mented	during	a	period	of	conflict	between	the	CPI	and	CPI‐M,	neither	of	





























The Indonesian Advances with Unintended Consequences 
As	in	India,	 independence	movements	 in	Indonesia	argued	for	civil	and	
political	rights	and	discussed	social	equity	but,	notwithstanding	this,	the	
ethnic	 Chinese	 were	 excluded	 and	 often	 labeled	 colonial	 compradors.	
Many	of	the	movements	were	led	by	intellectuals	and	aspiring	entrepre‐
neurs	from	the	progressive	sections	of	Muslim	and	other	religious	organ‐
izations.	 In	 contrast	 to	 South	 Asia	 and	 the	 Middle	 East,	 these	 leaders	
emerged	from	society	rather	than	from	the	remnants	of	old	regimes.	Their	
major	 priorities	 included	 support	 for	 self‐help	 businesses	 and	welfare	
schemes,	but	they	also	included	popularly	oriented	education	and	the	pro‐
motion	of	Bahasa	Indonesia	as	a	neutral	 lingua	franca.	The	concept	of	a	








Following	 a	 prolonged	 liberation	 struggle	 against	 the	 Japanese,	
Dutch,	and	British,	the	declaration	of	an	independent	republic	in	1945	was	
notable	in	the	extent	to	which	it	recognized	religious	and	ethnic	pluralism,	
political	and	civil	 rights,	and	social	 justice.	These	 ideals,	however,	were	
undermined	by	fierce	political	struggles.	At	the	time,	the	incoming	presi‐
dent,	Sukarno,	and	the	parliament	depended	extensively	on	autonomous	















The	 most	 dynamic	 movements	 were	 led	 by	 the	 rapidly	 growing	 Com‐
munist	Party,	 the	Partai	Komunis	 Indonesia	(PKI).	Like	 its	 Indian	sister	
party,	by	the	early	1950s	the	PKI	had	become	reformist	although	it	did	still	
push	for	some	more	radical	measures	such	as	the	need	for	land	reform.	It	
benefitted	 from	 the	democratic	 framework	and	 the	patronage	of	Presi‐






































bellion	 came,	 instead,	 from	 private	 entrepreneurs	 within	 natural	 re‐
source‐based	business	and	modern	Muslim	socio‐religious	organizations,	
Singaporean‐oriented	 “social	 democrats,”	 and	 liberal‐oriented	 students	









of	 national	 resources.	 The	 rent‐seeking	 and	 primitive	 accumulation	 of	

























italism.	 Liberal‐minded	 students	 and	 middle‐class	 activists	 who	 sup‐














































Third Generation: Democratization Against Crooked Development 
The	misdirected	policies	and	vested	interests	which	were	a	feature	of	the	
political	 shortcuts	 to	 progress	 in	 Kerala	 were,	 of	 course,	 insignificant	





















Brazil	and	several	other	Latin	American	countries	 in	 the	mid‐1980s,	 to	
South	Korea,	South	Africa,	and	finally	Indonesia,	it	was	mainly	new,	and	
often	 scattered	 leftist	movements	 that	 fought	 for	 citizen	 rights	 and	de‐
mocracy	and	thereby	fostered	the	general	idea	of	social	democracy.	
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Indonesian Challenges of Elitist Democratization and Populist 
Openings 








with	 organizations	which	 had	 survived	 the	New	Order,	 reached	 agree‐
ment	with	moderates	from	the	old	regime	to	introduce	various	social	lib‐
erties	and	a	program	of	decentralization,	and,	significantly,	to	hold	quick	
elections.	This	 last	measure	ensured	 that	 the	poorly	organized,	but	au‐
thentic,	advocates	of	social	democracy	were	bound	to	lose.		





ganizations	 (CSOs)	 and	 emerging	mass	movements.	 The	 latter	 had	 be‐
come	increasingly	fragmented	and	subordinated	by	the	resurgence	of	the	
liberal	 elitist	 politics	 that	 had	 been	 curbed	 40	 years	 earlier.	 This	 time	
around,	moreover,	they	were	far	from	what	had	been	the	world’s	largest	
democratically	oriented	popular	movement.	























mittees	 involving	 civil	 society	 actors	 and	 experts	were	 appointed	 from	
above	and	were	accountable	to	their	peers	rather	than	to	their	potential	




and	 issues,	 and	on	 emphasizing	 the	 role	of	 civil	 society	 in	 the	 struggle	
against	state	and	“rotten	politicians.”	This	 led	to	what	has	been	termed	







gitimacy	 and	 authority,	 beyond	 their	 knowledge	 and	 some	 “good	 con‐
tacts.”	 In	 particular,	 they	 lacked	 the	 organizational	 clout	 necessary	 to	
counter	their	adversaries’	economic	and	social	capital.	Fragmentation	re‐
mained	in	spite	of	numerous	efforts	to	bring	together	various	groups.	On	






through	 personal	 access	 to	 influential	 leaders	 rather	 than	 through	 any	
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membership‐based	organization	with	a	long‐term	agenda	for	public	pol‐
icy	 reforms	 that	most	 could	 agree	 on.	 Active	 citizenship	was	 also	 con‐
strained	by	the	fact	that	there	was	a	shortage	of	supportive	broad	organi‐
zations	that	could	assist	ordinary	people,	and	they	had,	instead,	to	turn	to	
local	patrons	or	 commercial	 intermediaries	 to	get	 access	 to	public	 ser‐
vices	such	as	health	care.	To	make	things	worse,	international	democracy	


















reconcile	 avant‐gardist	 ambitions	 with	 those	 of	 other	 activists,	 and	 to	
overcome	unfavorable	rules	and	regulations	relating	to	the	eligibility	of	
parties	to	run	 in	elections.	A	 third	strategy	was	to	build	a	 loose	federal	
party,	based	on	the	political	interests	of	different	political	organizations	
and	civil	society	groups.	But	this	strategy	too	failed	to	develop	a	unifying	




pora	 strategy,”	 which	 entailed	 joining	 elitist	 parties	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	





activist‐turned‐politicians	 in	 recent	 elections.	 A	 final	 set	 of	 strategies	


























The	 critical	 question,	 then,	 is	 whether	 and	 how	 these	 structural	




























President	Suharto	almost	ascended	 to	 the	presidency	 in	a	process	per‐
fected	in	the	United	States	by	Donald	Trump.	
Second,	counter‐movements	need	to	be	sufficiently	strong	and	have	
sufficient	 bargaining	power	 to	 enforce	 a	pact.	 For	 example,	 it	was	only	
when	organizations	representing	the	urban	poor	become	sufficiently	or‐




port	 of	 the	 law	 on	 universal	 public	 health	 services.	 Conversely,	 when	
Jokowi	campaigned	for	the	position	of	governor	of	Jakarta,	the	Solo	model	
could	not	really	be	applied	as	there	was	a	shortage	of	sectoral	and	civic	
groups	with	 popular	 following	 on	 the	 ground,	 beyond	 networking	 and	
lobbying.	Hence	Jokowi	and	his	team	had	to	turn	to	quick	fixes.	Similarly,	









































government,	 rather	 than	 to	 develop	 policy	 proposals,	 mobilize	 wide‐
spread	support,	and	try	to	foster	progressive	public	reforms.	
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When	 in	1991,	 the	Left	Front	 lost	 the	elections,	 the	 leadership	 fo‐









































as	well	 as	 the	abuse	of	 funds.	A	 third	problem	was	 the	 lack	of	 a	viable	
strategy	for	involving	the	“conventional”	interest	and	issue	based	organi‐
zations	 among	 farmers,	 laborers,	 and	 industrial	workers	 related	 to	 the	
mainstream	Left.	Fourth,	it	was	particularly	difficult	to	engage	the	middle	
classes,	given	that	welfare	and	production	measures	were	not	universal	
but	 targeted.	 As	 in	 other	 efforts	 at	 social	 democratic	 development,	 in‐
volvement	of	sections	of	the	middle	class	is	crucial	for	gaining	majorities	





































vironmental	 degradation	 of	 their	 land	 and	 neighborhoods.	 And	 even	 if	
some	support	is	forthcoming	from	leftist	political	parties	and	civil	society,	
the	outcome	is	rarely	positive.	




















self‐help	and	residential	groups	and	 in	 town	hall	meetings.	There	 is	an	




bly	 and	 state‐level	 ministers	 with	 access	 to	 pork	 barrel	 funds.	 There	
seems	to	be	a	growing	opinion	within	the	Left	of	the	need	to	combine	ef‐
forts	 to	 defend	 the	 least	well	 off	with	 the	mobilization	 of	 financial	 re‐
sources	for	industrial	and	other	development	projects	and	to	respond	to	
the	aspirations	of	the	middle	classes.	But	the	contours	are	blurred.	Kerala	
has	 essentially	 bypassed	 the	 stage	 of	 industrial	 development	 that	 was	
never	really	achieved	in	the	1950s	and	onward,	in	favor	of	postindustrial	
activities.	The	state	has	little	of	the	Global	North’s	broad	labor	movement	






























































Brazil	and	South	Africa.	The	humiliating	defeat	of	 the	 left	 front	govern‐
ment	in	West	Bengal	is	a	warning	of	what	is	to	be	expected	in	South	Africa	
if	the	African	National	Congress	(ANC)	and	the	mainstream	unions	do	not	


















to	 combatting	 undemocratic	 governance	 and	 the	 abuse	 of	welfare	 and	




are	 absolutely	 necessary	 to	 sustain	 and	 foster	 such	 cooperation	 and	
agreement.	
Such	developments	suggest	 that	 the	new	contradictions	of	uneven	






































tion	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	 scale	 up	 poverty	 relief	 in	 municipalities	 and	
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through	civil	 societies	 to	universal	 state	welfare	programs.	Agricultural	
communities	were	unable	to	take	care	of	all	the	new	laborers,	and	associ‐
ations	 and	 unions	 could	 not	 assist	 all	 the	 vulnerable	 people	 (Sandvik	
2016).	 In	 the	global	 South	 today,	attempts	at	 local	 citizenship	and	self‐
help,	such	as	through	participatory	budgeting,	must	also	be	related	to	uni‐


















ment	 insurance,	 that	 were	 also	 productive	 attracted	 business	 too.	
Measures	toward	full	employment	increased	production	and	the	tax	base.	























ances	 that	grow	out	of	 the	contradictions	of	 the	current	globalized	and	
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On the Sociocultural Foundations of Democratic Capitalism: 








































sons	why,	 he	 argues,	 the	 agents	 of	 neoliberal	 transformation	 have	 had	
such	an	easy	path,	and	why	change	has,	so	to	speak,	crept	up	behind	peo‐
ple’s	backs.	He	may	well	be	right.	We	need	to	examine	the	social	and	cul‐







I	 limit	 the	 discussion	 to	Norway	mainly	 because	 this	 is	 the	 case	 I	
know	best.	I	will	draw	on	a	variety	of	contributions	by	Norwegian	histori‐
ans	and	social	scientists	as	well	as	on	my	own	historical‐sociological	re‐
search	 on	Norwegian	 labor	 history.	When	 comparing	Norway	with	 the	





























































Capitalism and Democracy—and the Conditions for an “Ill-Suited 
Marriage”2 
In	an	introductory	essay	to	his	major	comparative	study	of	Scandinavian	


























                                                 
2		 Wolfgang	Streeck’s	expression	(2016).	
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The	 social	 democratic	 labor	movement,	 one	may	 say,	 transformed	
into	 what,	 in	 this	 chapter,	 I	 call	 democratic	 capitalism.	 They	 laid	 the	
ground	for	what	Wolfgang	Streeck	characterizes	as	“the	marriage	between	
democracy	 and	 capitalism,	 ill‐suited	 partners	 brought	 together	 in	 the	



























terests.	 Union	 building,	 successful	 struggles	 for	 collective	 agreements,	
and	management	of	competition	between	workers	established	the	power	
base	 for	 a	 class	 compromise	 that	 led	 to	 employment	 security	 and	 pay	
based	on	a	relative	share	of	increased	productivity.	At	the	national	level,	
states	became	third	parties	 in	the	class	compromise,	 introducing	insur‐
ance	 programs	 that	 covered	 injury,	 ill	 health,	 and	 unemployment,	 and,	
more	generally,	protection	against	the	impact	of	the	market	on	individual	
citizens.	In	the	history	of	welfare	capitalism	such	programs	have	been	of	










tutionalization	 of	 class	 conflict”	 through	 collective	 agreements	 and	 the	
mutual	 recognition	 of	 organizations	 as	 contractual	 partners	 were,	 and	
are,	certainly	an	important	condition	for	social	security	for	working	peo‐
ple.	The	systems	developed	for	collective	bargaining	and	 labor	 law	also	
constitute	 important	 arenas	 for	 social	 exchange,	 the	 establishment	 of	
common	norms,	 and	 trust	 building.	 First	 and	 foremost,	 however,	 these	






the	 advantages	 of	 the	 compromise.	 “Democratic	 capitalism	 rests	 on	 a	 class	
compromise	between	labour	and	capital	in	which	the	interests	of	both	sides	are	
to	varying	extents	accommodated.”	The	outcome	of	this	has	been	the	significant	
















religion,	 and	 the	 right	 to	own	property).	 It	was	only	 after	 a	 century	or	
more	of	political	struggle	that	this	was	expanded	to	include	political	citi‐
zenship,	identified	with	the	core	element	of	democracy,	“the	right	to	par‐

























In	 similar	ways	 philosophers	 and	 political	 theorists	 alike	 have	 as‐
serted	 that	 it	 is	 not	 enough	 to	 establish	 (formal)	 democratic	 political	
rules;	equally	important	is	the	development	of	the	capacities	of	the	people	













for	 self‐governance	 through	participation	by	 independent,	 autonomous	
members	of	the	group	or	the	society.	A	set	of	key	rules	and	institutions	are	
therefore	precisely	those	that	secure	and	develop	individual	autonomy.	A	






sociocultural	 foundations	 of	 the	 development	 of	 autonomy	 and	 demo‐
cratic	life	within	it.	






























years	 later,	 following	 strong	 mobilization	 in	 the	 growing	 progressive	
women’s	movement,	this	right	was	extended	to	all	adult	women	in	1913.	
In	the	industrial	expansion	in	Norway	which	began	at	the	end	of	the	
nineteenth	 century,	 the	 construction	 of	 hydroelectrical	 power	 stations	
played	a	central	role.	A	stable	supply	of	cheap	electrical	power	was	a	basic	
condition	 for	 the	development	 of	 chemical	 and	 electrometallurgical	 in‐
dustries	in	several	places	around	the	country.	Given	the	lack	of	Norwegian	
private	capital	for	such	investments,	a	farsighted	nationally	oriented	gov‐












were	dependent	on	 the	 support	 of	 others	 for	 their	 survival	 (see	Castel	
2003).	This	problem	was	aggravated	by	a	growing	population,	which	saw	
an	increase	from	1	million	people	in	1820,	to	2	million	in	1890,	and	to	3	
























duction	 of	 socialist	 rule	 and	 a	 socialist	 economy.	 The	 Labour	 Party	
adopted	a	revolutionary	program,	elected	a	group	of	revolutionary	lead‐












The	 labor	movement	 had	 experienced	 severe	 setbacks	 throughout	
the	1920s.	A	deep	economic	crisis	in	the	early	1920s	had	given	employer	















































































vision	of	 their	members,	 they	also	 saw	 the	need	 to	 caution	against	 the	










































cialism.	Rather,	 they	 came	 from	 the	 leading	actors	of	 the	political	 right	
who	felt	that	these	laws	represented	a	severe	attack	on	the	principles	of	a	
state	governed	by	the	rule	of	 law	(rettsstat).	Political	practice	based	on	







































hensive	 schools,	 and	 laid	 the	 ground	 for	 equal	 access	 to	 higher	 educa‐





What Kind of Democracy?  
The	 character	 of	Norwegian	 democracy	was	 a	 central	 theme	 of	 debate	
among	historians	in	the	1960s	and	1970s.	An	influential	proposition	on	






























































supervised	 by	 special	 shop	 stewards,	 were	 carried	 out;	 disagreements	
were	sent	to	arbitration	by	a	special	national	committee;	and	all	local	re‐
sistance	was	effectively	absorbed	within	the	 institutional	order	of	what	




































the	 borders	 of	 the	 nation‐state.	 Through	 this	 process,	 they	 not	 only	
achieved	political	and	economic	status	within	the	state,	and	they	could	in‐
creasingly	 identify	with	an	 “imagined	 community”	 of	national	 citizenry	


















within	 the	 socialist	movement	 in	 the	nineteenth	 century.	 It	 had	been	a	
strong	theme	within	the	newly	formed	socialist	movement	that	full	free‐
dom	from	capitalism	could	only	be	achieved	by	simultaneous	socialist	rev‐
























































firm‐level	 committees	 for	 production	 and	 organizational	 development,	





gressively	 larger	role	 in	 the	actual	processes	of	organizational	develop‐
ment	and	modernization.		













factors	 that	 has	 contributed	 to	 economic	 development	 in	Norway.	 This	
may	well	be	true,	but	for	our	discussion	it	 is	more	important	to	bear	in	
mind	the	important	role	that	this	cooperation	played	in	the	development	
of	 the	norms	and	values	of	democratic	participation,	both	 in	 the	work‐


























ocean	apart	 from	the	upper	middle	class	and	 the	social	 elites.	 Further‐
more,	welfare	programs	gave	people	the	status	of	full	members	of	society	
even	when	they	were	not	able	to	work.	At	the	same	time,	national	radio	








generation	 to	 take	part	 in	 the	 educational	 revolution	 of	 the	1960s	 and	
1970s,	 the	 changes	 in	 self‐expression	 and	 social	 identity	 that	 occurred	
throughout	 the	 course	of	 their	 lives	were	 enormous.	From	a	 childhood	
typified	by	simple	living	conditions,	the	large	gulf	between	rich	and	poor	
and	 uneducated	 and	 educated,	 the	 understanding	 that	 belonging	 to	 a	
lower	class	was	a	natural	destiny	which	demanded	respect	and	deference	













The Social Democracy Meets Neoliberalism  






























as	Wendy	Brown	describes	 it	 in	her	 latest	 book.	Neoliberalism,	 she	as‐
serts,	 “is	 quietly	 undoing	 basic	 elements	 of	 democracy,”	which	 include	
“vocabularies,	 principles	 of	 justice,	 political	 cultures,	 habits	 of	 citizen‐
ships,	 practices	 of	 rule,	 and	 above	 all,	 democratic	 imaginaries”	 (Brown	









vidual	 and	 social	 equality	 between	 groups.	 These	 are	minimum	 condi‐














International	 Monetary	 Fund,	 Organization	 for	 Economic	 Cooperation	
and	Development,	and	the	World	Bank,	actively	advocated	the	adoption	of	
neoliberal	policies,	whether	as	a	conditionality	of	donor	aid	or	a	part	of	a	


























insecurity	 and	 fear—was	 the	 corrosive	 force	 that	 had	 threatened	 and	
might	again	threaten	the	liberal	world”	(Judt	2010:	323).	In	order	to	coun‐








outcome.	 When,	 in	 the	 early	 1930s,	 the	 Norwegian	 social	 democratic	
































a	 period	 of	 organized	 international	 capitalism.	 International	 markets	








vere	 conditionalities	 in	 the	 granting	 of	 financial	 loans,	 demanding	 that	
they	open	up	 their	national	economies	 to	 the	 international	market	and	
swamping	them	with	neoliberal	economic	counselors.	At	the	same	time	
the	 process	 of	 financialization	 became	 steadily	 more	 dominant	 in	 the	





















support	 for	real	economic	growth	 in	 the	post‐Apartheid	era	with	a	Na‐
tional	Treasury	dominated	 by	neoliberal	 economists	 responding	 to	 the	
signals	of	global	investment	capital.		
Besides	a	focus	on	“real”	economic	activity,	growth	in	the	Norwegian	







mand	 for	goods	and	services	 in	 the	national	economy.	The	 “happy	mo‐
ment	of	social	democracy”	in	the	decades	after	World	War	II,	as	explained,	
was	built	on	the	basis	of	a	broadly	defined	class	compromise	which,	from	
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Democratic Development State or Competition State? Toward 









provides	 little	 insight	 into	 the	 formation	 of	 democratic	 developmental	














of	 the	economy.”	How	to	reign	 in	 the	 independence	of	democracies,	 in‐
deed,	has	been	a	concern	of	the	proponents	of	neoliberalism	since	the	ad‐
vent	of	the	concept	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Second	World	War	(Plehwe	et	
al.	 2006).	 The	 questions	 raised	 in	 this	 chapter,	 thus,	 relate	 to	whether	






rent	 global	 neoliberal	 onslaught,	 and	 whether	 the	 emergence	 of	 some	
form	 of	 counterhegemonic,	 post‐national	 solidarity	 is	 possible	without	
undermining	democracies	of	nation‐states.	










constitution	 establishes	 the	 parameters	 for	 the	 competition	 state	 and	
these	are	strongly	influenced	by	the	interests	of	multinational	companies	
that	 bring	 considerable	 pressure	 to	 bear	 on	 civil	 law,	 social	 policy,	
knowledge	and	research,	and	on	environmental	policies.	According	to	Gill	
the	 “New	 constitutionalism	 limits	 democratic	 control	 over	 central	 ele‐
ments	of	economic	policy	and	regulation	by	locking	in	future	governments	
to	 liberal	 frameworks	 of	 accumulation	 premised	 on	 freedom	 of	 enter‐
prise”	(Gill	2002:	47).	The	global	economic	order	is	regulated	by	various	
multilateral	 financial	agencies,	 including	 the	World	Trade	Organization,	
the	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF),	World	Bank,	and	the	Organization	




                                                 
2		 The	 OECD,	 in	 particular,	 has	 become	 a	 central	 force	 in	 shaping	 the	 new	
constitutionalism	 and	 in	 overruling	 the	 constitutionalism	 of	 the	 nation‐state.	
Directing	its	rhetoric	toward	developing	states,	it	speaks	of	the	need	for	“global	

















national	 constitution	opened	up	prospects	 for	a	more	 inclusive	democ‐






competition	state	 increasingly	 impact	on	 the	autonomy,	and	 indeed	the	







                                                 
3		 In	Norway	the	legislature	is	still	called	the	Norwegian	House.	




combined	national	expenditure	of	 the	bottom	163	states,	and	greater	 than	 the	
gross	 domestic	 product	 (GDP)	 of	 the	 bottom	 137	 states..	 many	 of	 the	 top	 20	









pensation,	 commercial	 banks,	 now	 liberated	 from	 their	 national	 roots,	
preside	 over	 interest	 rates	 and	 currency	 circulation	 and	 have	 become	
more	influential	in	shaping	the	course	of	the	economy	than	national	leg‐
islatures	 and	 parliaments.	 However,	 notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
democratic	development	state	is	under	threat	from	the	growing	hegem‐
ony	 of	 neoliberalism,	 it	 is	 evident,	 as	 both	 Evans	 (2005)	 and	 Streeck	
(2013)	suggest,	that	it	still	holds	the	potential	to	advance	an	alternative	
form	of	globalization,	which	strengthens	democratic	values	within	nation‐
states,	 respects	national	 sovereignty,	 and	gives	 substance	 to	 this	 in	 the	
policies	and	practices	of	international	financial	institutions.	
The Democratic Development State 
A	democratic	development	state	may	be	defined	as	one	that	is	sensitive	


































An Analytical Model 





























ization,	 it	 can	be	 seen	 that	 the	autonomy	of	 these	 institutions	within	 a	
sphere	of	mutual	 influence	 is	 a	precondition	 for	 a	democratic	develop‐
ment	state.	Here	I	do	not	see	these	as	“systems”	that	merely	interact	with	











ated	 variations	 over	 time.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 studies	
have	 been	 based	 primarily	 on	 stereotypical	 Anglo‐American	 and	 Ger‐
manic	 economies,	 the	 most	 common	 variation	 discernible	 is	 between	
what	might	be	considered	the	incremental	and	radical	innovation	strate‐
gies	adopted	in	different	types	of	capitalism.	In	the	incremental	economy	
learning,	 to	 a	 considerable	extent,	 takes	place	 in	 the	workplace.	 In	 this	
system	there	is	continuous	interaction	between	different	skill	levels	in	an	
organization	 and	 this	 forms	 part	 of	 capacity	 building	 and,	 at	 the	 same	























vation	becomes	 the	 focal	point	of	 interest	 rather	 the	 factory,	which	be‐
comes	merely	the	site	for	the	fabrication	of	new	products.	The	transfor‐
mation	of	fixed	capital	 into	circulating	capital	 frees	up	funds	for	 invest‐













tablishing	 an	 equilibrium	 between	workers	 and	 employers	 has	 largely	
disappeared,	and	they	now	function	more	as	protest	movements.	Qualifi‐
cations	 have	 also	 become	 less	 clearly	 defined	 and	 workplace	 learning	



































































oriented	 decision‐making	 model	 that	 overshadows	 what	 is	 seen	 as	 a	
“goal‐oriented”	model	of	decision	making.	The	establishment	of	rules	reg‐
ulating	what	economic	actors	do	in	the	market	is	seen	as	more	important	
                                                 
8		 In	 their	 discussion	 on	 how	 TRIPS	 overtook	 Word	 Intellectual	 Property	
Organization,	which	had	been	dominated	by	developing	countries,	Montes	and	
Popov	describe	 the	pressures	 that	 emerging	economies	 are	under	 to	 adjust	 to	
western	technology/knowledge,	and	how	much	they	lose	due	to	the	TRIPS	system	
in	the	process:	“Total	losses	of	Western	companies	from	piracy	were	estimated	
















human	 capital	 to	 productive	 ends.	 The	 primary	 role	 of	 the	 democratic	
state	is	to	appeal	to	economic	actors	to	treat	people	fairly,	as	evidenced	in	
































written,	 at	 personal	 cost,	 by	 private	 insurance	 companies.9	 Individual	
achievement	is	presented	as	an	antidote	to	what	is	portrayed	as	the	paci‐





Democracies,	 of	 course,	 vary	 considerably	 in	 terms	of	 their	 repre‐
sentative	structures	and	electoral	regimes,	but	what	is	of	significance	is	














to	40%),	 and	 the	highest	proportion	of	 those	not	voting	 is	 to	be	 found	
among	the	poor	and	socially	marginalized,	it	is	evident	that	the	enormous	









lished	 in	1992,	Rueschemeyer	et	al.	posed	 the	question	 “what	happens	
when	capitalism	and	democracy	confront	one	another?”	and,	in	so	doing,	






















ing	 hegemony	 of	 global	 neoliberalism,	 the	 power	 and	 influence	 of	 the	
working	class	and	allied	segments	of	the	middle	class	has	been	severely	
























The Nordic Variant of Capitalism 
In	the	ongoing	debate	on	the	essence	of	a	democratic	developmental	state,	
the	model	underpinning	the	successes	of	the	Nordic	states	has	received	
close	 scrutiny	 for	 the	potential	which	 it	 holds	 for	 emerging	 economies	
































quired	 a	 centralizing	 power	 to	 direct	 knowledge	 production	 toward	 a	
greater	focus	on	innovation.	Universities	and	research	centers,	in	this	new	







universities,	 but	 owned	 and	 directed	 by	 the	 unified	 research	 council.12	
The	influence	of	this	mega	council	is	also	apparent	in	its	role	as	a	govern‐




                                                 
12		 Drori	et	al.	have	shown	how	the	number	of	national	science	policy	organizations,	
intergovernmental	science	organizations,	national	science	ministries,	and	a	vari‐




































port	emphasizes	 the	 importance	of	marshaling	all	available	research	 in	





























side	NRF	(National	Research	Foundation)	 to	achieve	 this”	 (OECD	2007;	
ibid).	
Neoliberalism and Globalization 
Neoliberalism	and	globalization,	which	together	constitute	the	dominant	
















state	(through,	 for	example,	 the	expanded	influence	of	market	 forces	 in	
social	and	political	life);	and	to	many	new	legal	“informalities”	such	as	the	






















                                                 
13		 This	may	be	 seen	 in	 the	 internationalization	of	 the	 legal	profession	and	 in	 the	
many	 laws	 and	 agreements	 relating	 to	 the	mobilization	 of	 capital,	 investment	


















lar	 democracy	 (local	 government),	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 sufficient	 power	 to	
begin	dismantling	the	collective	aspects	of	the	welfare	state.	This	has	in‐
cluded	the	proposal	to	deregulate	labor,	in	line	with	the	Danish	flexicurity	


















by	 implication,	 representation	on	 their	boards)	 that	 the	state	 is	able	 to	
                                                 























the	 democratic	welfare	 state	 toward	 a	 society	 based	 on	 human	 capital	
achievement,	the	seemingly	inescapable	imperatives	of	the	global	division	
of	 labor,	 specialized	 services,	 and	 the	 mobility	 of	 the	 so‐called	 highly	
skilled.	Returning	to	our	model,	the	shift	toward	neoliberalism	in	Norway	
is	illustrative	of	how	a	state	bureaucracy,	engaged	in	various	national	and	































the	future,	 then,	 it	 is	unlikely,	as	Olsen	(2014)	suggests,	 that	the	lasting	







ulatory	 system	 created	by	multilateral	 financial	 agencies.	 The	question	
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cordance	with	democratic	values?	There	 is,	of	 course,	no	 consensus	on	
these	issues	but	rather	a	number	of	interpretations	of	how	the	history	of	
social	 formations	might	 have	 been	 shaped	 by	 these	 relationships.	 The	
chapters	in	this	book	confirm	that	the	idea	of	a	democratic	developmental	




least	 because	 it	 raises	 fundamental	 questions	 about	 how	 economic	
















ment	 in	 terms	of	both	 its	economic	effectiveness	and	durability	 (meas‐
ured	in	terms	of	limited	social	and	political	dissonance	and	resistance).	
Although	it	is	difficult	to	define	this	mode	of	democratic	development	









authoritarian	 tendencies.	 Reflective	 of	 this,	 in	 the	 Oxford	Handbook	 of	
Asian	Business	Systems	(Oxford	2014)	China	is	labeled	“authoritarian	cap‐
italism,”	 Indonesia	 “oligarchic	 capitalism,”	 Japan	 “coordinated	 capital‐
ism,”	 Malaysia	 “personal	 Capitalism,”	 the	 Philippines	 “trapped	 capital‐
ism,”	 Singapore	 “open	 state‐led	 capitalism,”	 South	 Korea	 “plutocratic	
state‐led	 capitalism,”	 Taiwan	 “SME‐oriented	 capitalism	 in	 transition,”	










where	 elites	have	 sacrificed	democratic	principles	 for	 the	 sake	of	 their	
own	economic	interests.	As	was	the	case	in	the	era	of	the	ascendant	de‐









deed,	 a	 real	 conflict	 between	 democratic	 values	 and	 capitalism.	 In	 this	
Nordic	understanding,	democratic	values	refer	to	the	pursuit	of	equal	op‐












decision‐making	 by	managers	 and	 capital	 owners.	 Capitalism	 is	 not	
democratic,	democracy	not	capitalist.	(Merkel	2014:	109)	
From	 this	 perspective	 it	might	 be	 inferred	 that	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	



















democratic	 freedom,	 and	 choices,	 irrespective	 of	 their	 significance,	 are	

















































































a	new	democratic	order	 in	South	Africa	 in	 the	 lead	up	to	democracy	 in	
1994,	and	the	manner	in	which	the	social	democratic	ideals	that	surfaced	
during	 this	 time	were	ultimately	 subverted	by	neoliberal	 nostrums	ad‐
vanced	by	the	World	Bank	and	various	Northern	states.	Of	interest	is	the	
fact	that	there	were	thinkers	in	South	Africa	at	the	time	who	were	seri‐
ously	 considering	 the	 merits	 of	 pursuing	 a	 Nordic	 social	 democratic	
model.		
























talism,	 it	was	believed,	produced	growth	and,	 in	so	doing,	 it	would	ulti‐
mately	provide	a	platform	for	democratic	participation	through	growing	
consumer	awareness.	
The	members	 of	MERG	 (MERG	 1993),	 who	 broadly	 embraced	 the	
ideas	of	the	Congress	of	South	African	Trade	Unions	(COSATU),	contested	






fect	will	 distribute	 the	 benefits	 to	 the	 disadvantaged.	 The	MERG	 ap‐
proach,	however,	targets	the	disadvantaged	directly	(p.	4).		
In	 an	 endeavor	 to	 develop	 a	 broad	 consensus	 MERG	 attempted,	 with	
mixed	success,	to	build	a	network,	if	not	exactly	an	alliance,	between	civil	
society	organizations,	progressive	state	officials,	trade	unions,	represent‐
atives	 of	 big	 business,	 and	 the	 leadership	 of	 various	democratic	move‐
ments	at	both	national	and	local	levels	(MERG	1993).	They	were	also	con‐
vinced	 that	 the	mass	 social	mobilization,	 then	underway	country‐wide,	







struction	 and	Development	 Programme	 (RDP),	which	was	 produced	 in	
1994	shortly	before	it	assumed	power.	However,	despite	the	wide	popular	
support	for	this	approach,	particularly	among	trade	unions	and	civil	soci‐
ety	 organizations,	 MERG	 proposals	 for	 a	 social	 democracy	 ultimately	


























velopment;	 (and)	 greater	 labour	market	 flexibility”	 (Department	 of	 Fi‐
nance	1996:	2).	










coming	 a	 vehicle	 for	 grassroots	 democracy,	 local	 government	 became	
simply	a	vehicle	for	the	distribution	of	central	state	services,	devoid	of	any	
meaningful	political	influence.	













forms	 of	 forced	 segregation	 and	 labor	 control	 that	 divided	 families.	
(Newman	and	De	Lannoy	2014:	225)	
Thus,	it	was	the	NEM	program	that	informed	economic	strategy	and	real	




growing	distrust	 in	democracy.	May’s	chapter	 in	 the	book,	 for	example,	
relates	how	 the	 reforms	needed	 to	 address	poverty	 (including	 land	 re‐
form,	reform	of	the	banking	sector,	and	reform	of	working	conditions)	are	
generally	missing.	According	to	May:	
These	 (reforms)	would	need	 to	 involve	 redistribution	measures	 that	


































Prospects for a Renewal of Social Democracy and Democratic 
Developmental States in the South 
Despite	 a	 renewed	 interest	 in	 the	 developmental	 state	 in	 South	Africa,	
there	 had	 been	 a	marked	 shift	 from	 the	 ideas	 of	 social	 democracy	 es‐
poused	in	the	transitional	era	to	the	current	embrace	of	neoliberal	policy.	














there	 is	 typically	 an	 implicit	 assumption	about	 the	 compatibility	of	de‐




















































known	 for	 its	 egalitarianism,	 inequality	 has	 grown	 as	 a	 new	 economic	
elite	has	 linked	 its	 fortunes	 to	global	capitalism	and	 the	expense	of	 the	
majority.	
Those	who	govern	the	system	of	global	capitalism,	that	is	those	who	












The	 democratic	 core	 principles	 that	 authoritative	 political	 decisions	
can	only	be	taken	by	those	who	are	legitimized	by	constitutional‐dem‐
ocratic	procedures,	and	the	principle	of	political	equality,	which	is	di‐





































sensus	 that	 strong	 labor	unions,	 capable	of	 influencing	 relations	 in	 the	












inequality	are	 typically	 those	where	unions,	both	at	 firm	 level	and	as	a	
centralized	collective	force,	have	been	weakened.	
Linked	to	the	ideal	of	a	social	contract,	where	all	parties	are	commit‐










large	 segments	 of	 the	 population	 have	 not	 benefitted	 from	 economic	
growth	in	the	democratic	era	and	the	social	divide	has,	in	fact,	widened.	
The	importance	of	unions	is	also	to	be	found	in	their	oversight	role	






pose	 companies	attempting	 to	 circumvent	 taxation	by	moving	 their	 ac‐
counts	offshore	or	by	other	forms	of	creative	accountancy.	Furthermore,	










The	experiences	of	 the	Nordic	states	reveal	 that,	 in	contrast	 to	 the	 top‐
down	model	of	the	East	Asian	developmental	state,	a	democratic	develop‐
mental	 state	will	 need	 to	be	 constructed	 from	below.	That	 is,	 it	 is	 only	






















cratic	 developmental	 state.	 It	 is,	 nevertheless,	 hard	 to	 accept	 Colin	
Crouch’s	fatalistic	assertion	that	it	is	“too	late	to	save	democracy	from	be‐
ing	anything	other	 than	a	 façade	 for	 the	operation	of	private	economic	
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